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Concerns over employment in Global Value Chains (GVCs) have risen in recent years,
particularly following the 2008 financial crisis. This has led to the publication of a
number of reports by international institutions, on the possible labour impact of
chains. Some of these reports insist on win-win scenarios, where GVCs are supposed to
promote growth whilst also leading to poverty reduction. The World Development
Report 2020, for instance, hardly highlights the many points of tension linked to GVCs-
based capitalism, despite decades of studies indicating the very fragile type of
transnational business relations and employment it relies on (a critique by Leyden and
Selwyn can be found here). On the other hand, the WTO GVC Development Report
2019 seems to suggest a more cautious approach to the issue. In particular, the report
recognises the skills-polarising effects GVCs had on employment, and the missing link
between rises in low-skill employment and real wages, theorised on the basis of classical
models of international trade. In the executive summary, David Dollar openly
acknowledges that comparative advantage and the Stopler-Samuelson theorem (arguing
that international trade leads to convergence of the prices of production factors - wages
in the case of employment) may not really work that well in developing regions. Indeed,
his statement acknowledges a truth that has been recognised by many others for some
time.
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Despite its concessions, however, the report’s take on employment remains limited by a
number of in-built inaccurate assumptions regarding: the linearity and temporality of
employment gains and pathways in GVCs; the nature of skills and skill-formation; and
the type of wage gains needed to sustain workers’ livelihood meaningfully in developing
regions. In this short commentary I briefly raise three critical points against the
assumptions at the basis of this report. I discuss the temporality of employment in GVCs;
the gendered construction of skills and employment disadvantage; and the need to move
the debate from individual wages to social wages in order to truly assess the
‘reproductive’ - or more simply, livelihood - implications of GVCs employment on
labouring classes.
In developing these arguments, I rely on my long-term field research experience in
studying Asia’s garment and textile value chains and their labour relations, standards
and practices, while I also benefit from the insights of decades of feminist political
economy research around the unevenness of the development process. In a post COVID-
19 world, attention to these issues, shaping employment in GVCs will become even more
pressing, given the dis-integration of many GVCs witnessed during the pandemic, and
the likely further raise in labour insecurity within them.
Point 1 - Time and GVCs While accepting the problematic nature of some
employment outcomes in many global circuits, the 2019 WTO GVC Development Report
still assumes the presence of linear benefits from involvement in GVCs production and
trade. Crudely put, the report argues that the current organisation of production and
trade in GVCs still remains a broadly positive scenario, based on employment
generation. There is simply the need to correct GVCs tendency towards skill-polarisation
and low-skill bias. In fact, the report admits that GVCs’ beneficial effects seem to
primarily favour those with better jobs, and may not – do not - manifest for workers with
lower levels of skills. GVCs employment remains largely preferable to informal economy
alternatives, but skills upgrading may be necessary.
However, employment issues in GVCs can hardly be merely ascribed to skill-
polarisation. First, arguably, across the many labour-intensive industries forming the
backbone of GVCs-based capitalism, high levels of labour precarisation may
systematically prevent skill-formation. That is, the problem does not lie with skills, but
with the lack of time to acquire them. GVCs employment is a very short-lived experience
for many workers. In sectors like garment and textile, evidence from countries like
Bangladesh or India suggests that many workers are out of GVCs by the time they are
30-35 years of age.
Secondly, after being employed in GVCs for a maximum of 10-15 years, many of these
workers may simply go back to informal economy jobs. This means that GVCs do not set
different employment pathways. They merely represent a temporary phase in a longer
work pathway where labouring classes experience different forms of precarity, within
and outside GVCs. Evidence from India suggests that former garment workers may
return to the same informal jobs they were performing before joining GVCs. While in
some cases they may leave GVCs factories with some savings, in many others they do so
with varying levels of debt. Obviously, these outcomes may not be due to GVCs
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employment at all, but rather to the features of precarious living in many developing
contexts. We shall not fall in the same ‘cake-division fallacy’ of many global commodity
studies, which assume that all development outcomes are dictated by the participation in
GVCs. However, at the very lest we can conclude that GVCs employment is hardly a
game-changer for workers in developing regions. The short temporality of employment
in GVCs further limits the purchase of comparative advantage arguments, by revealing
structural limitations that go well-beyond low-skill traps.
Point 2 – The social construction of skills and GVCs Somewhat surprisingly, the
2019 WTO GVC Development Report acknowledges that a large share of GVCs
employment is composed of women workers. This point is welcome, as reference to
gender is hardly mainstreamedwithin Global Governance and Financial Institutions,
which explains why the development process still suffers from the same ‘male-bias’
denounced by Diane Elson three decades ago. The Report recognises that often women
workers may not experience the potential benefits of GVCs employment, but it ascribes
this problem to their initial incorporation into GVCs, based on lower levels of both assets
and skills. To an extent, some of these assumptions may be true – for instance, women
may enter employment in GVCs as landless workers or already in debt. However, this
simply confirms that GVCs hardly ‘fix’ initial conditions of entry into labour markets, but
they rather merely magnify ‘adverse incorporation’. In short, GVCs are not particularly
‘developmental’. On the other hand, they cannot ‘fix’ wages as wages are not determined
by trade, but formed in labour markets that are gendered, racialised, and bearers of
multiple inequalities.
Moreover, if we move our attention from assets to skills, the position of the report
becomes far more problematic. The issue is not that women cannot reap the benefits of
GVCs employment due their initial lower level of skills. On the contrary, women’s
incorporation into GVCs is based exactly on their structural disadvantage and the
gendered socially constructed nature of their representation as lower-skills workers. On
the shopfloors I visited, women sat on the assembly line next to male workers, doing
exactly the same job, but were paid significantly less because they are women. The lower
wages paid to women are assets for both global businesses and local suppliers in GVCs,
as they keep final prices down. This is the ‘comparative advantage of women’s
disadvantage’. As women are often hired exactly because they are cheaper and more
vulnerable workers – feminist economists like Stephanie Seguino have amply
demonstrated how gender-wage gaps were used as a substitute for monetary policy to
boost export in East Asia. Expectations that the same GVCs benefiting from their
subordination may help fix it are naïve at best.
Point 3 - Social Reproduction and workers’ livelihoods in GVCs The final
critical point I raise against the 2019 WTO GVC Development Report is that it remains
stuck in a neoclassical static framework in which gains or losses are indicated with little
reflection on initial conditions. For GVCs employment to be beneficial, workers should
not merely experience one-off increases in wages. They should also experience improved
livelihoods. Such improvements can only be tested against the totality of conditions of
employment of GVCs workers. In the previous sections, I deconstructed assumptions on
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employment linearity and stereotypes about women’s work and skills in GVCs. Here,
before concluding this short intervention, I want to move further, and discredit a whole
model merely focusing on wage-movements for individual workers.
The question is: even if we observed wage increases in labour-intensive GVCs, could we
talk about comparative advantage working for all? No, we could not. One-off wage-gains
may not challenge at all the temporality of employment in GVCs, if they do not in turn
restructure reproductive conditions of workers in industrial areas across the global
workshops of the world. First, to meaningfully tackle improvements in employment
conditions, discussions on wages should focus on living wages. Secondly, such living
wages should always be assessed against the possibility for both workers and their
families to make an industrial living. As things stand, this is hardly the case. Across
‘Factory Asia’, circular labour migration from China and India alone involves
respectively almost 300 and 150 circular migrants every year; that is, the entire
population of the United States. This is because industrial areas hosts millions of
workers paid salaries far too low to allow them to bring their family with them. Hence,
these stay back in rural areas, and workers eventually re-join them back and forth,
endlessly regenerating precarious employment as a key feature of GVCs.
Social Distance, by Hasif Khan
On the other hand, GVCs benefit from these massive reservoirs of footloose labour,
which can be easily retrenched during economic crises. We had a bitter taste of this
during the Global Lockdown, when millions of GVCs workers were left jobless instantly,
as global buyers cancelled orders for millions of dollars. In countries like India, workers
were also left to their own devices to return home. News channels across the world have
broadcasted the images of a huge army of Indian migrant workers marching back home
on foot. The Indian drawer Hasif Khan, has poignantly sketched the magnitude of this
exodus of workers in his drawing Social Distance (above). Now: that army of workers in
India and elsewhere – who make clothes; shoes; phones; tablets; computers and so
much more for middle classes across our planet, in greatly precarious working
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arrangements, with minimal labour security and great risk exposure during crises - is
what employment in GVCs really looks like. Perhaps, future reports exploring issues of
work in GVCs should start from an acknowledgement of the utter inadequacy of
international trade models - including their recent GVCs avatars - to capture the many
issues experienced by workers labouring across the global economy. Obviously, the
economic models criticised here do not cause working poverty. However, their
misinterpretation of the concrete world of work continues diverting energy and
resources away from more meaningful economic and policy debates.
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